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Abstract
Access control is central to interfacing with personal data,
however most systems today are too coarse and disconnected
from the privacy context of the data. Granular access con-
trol rarely goes beyond limiting sample rates or enforcing
time limits. In this paper, we present a system for tuning a
data consumer’s access to personal data based on real-time
privacy metrics. We first explore the potential definitions of
privacy in this context with a focus on information theoretic
metrics for defining privacy in sensitive time series data. We
then implement and evaluate our system for embedding risk
thresholds into bearer token-based access control systems to
attenuate access to data of different granularities based on
these metrics. Our results show that our system provides pri-
vacy gains wihout a significant utility cost, and can run effi-
ciently and scale well on cheap hardware with high-frequncy
sensor data.
1. Introduction
When it comes to personal data, traditional access control
mechanisms between a producer and a consumer of data
exhibit critical problems. With social media APIs, phone
sensors, and even files on a PC, access is most often a
binary “all or nothing”. While in some cases access can be
attenuated to read or write, and can expire after a certain
time period, this level of granularity is too coarse, and does
not consider the content of the data in any way.
APIs that do allow more fine-grained controls often re-
quire an understanding of the context and possible infer-
ences [5], to then allow a user take context-specific actions
such as spoofing GPS coordinates or occluding faces in im-
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ages. While this is useful, it is difficult to scale and gener-
alize to arbitrary data types without user interaction or com-
plexity for understanding semantics.
Furthermore, users are often unaware of just what infor-
mation they really are exposing [1], and cannot be expected
to keep track of inferences that may be caused by anomalies
or patterns in their data, especially not in real time. Dynam-
ically adjusting access control restrictions based on online
privacy and risk metrics remains an open problem.
These shortcomings culminate in access control mecha-
nisms with only very superficial privacy awareness. The goal
of this work is to introduce a scalable, privacy-aware access
control system that solves these problems.
We seek to do this by applying established, information-
theoretic privacy metrics as criteria in access control sys-
tems over time series data. These metrics must be context-
independent, operate in real time on cheap hardware located
at the source of data. These constraints are imposed by the
context in which we deploy this system and evaluate its per-
formance and extent of privacy preservation.
While our method is applicable to any system where a
consumer pulls personal data from a producer under the
restrictions of an access control system, we implement and
evaluate it in the context of the Databox platform [7] —
a home-based networked device that provides a controlled,
sandboxed environment for processing personal data. Here,
third-party drivers query external data sources and write data
to system-managed stores. These are then queried by apps
that perform analytics and, if necessary, only emit results
back to third parties.
Figure 1 shows the components pertinent to this sys-
tem. Here, solid arrows denote the paths that data can flow.
As a single app can read from and write to many stores,
these paths can manifest themselves as complex networks of
cross-source analytics and derived stores. Our access con-
trol systems act at the red arrows. The arbiter mints signed
bearer tokens with privacy thresholds embedded within
them, and passes these on to apps and drivers. When inter-
facing with stores, these tokens are independently verified
by said stores. Finally, any data leaving the box to be con-
sumed by a third party is similarly subjected to the same
thresholds.
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Figure 1. A high-level overview of Databox components
The core approach to how our system is deployed in
this context is therefore twofold. As stores act as a border
between producers and consumers, we first continuously
update and maintain a privacy context for each data stream
within each store using common privacy metrics. Then in
tracking these metrics, we adjust the flows (in the simplest
case by suppressing them or repeating old values) based
on thresholds embedded within the tokens used to query a
stream.
In this paper, we describe an implementation of this using
information theoretic privacy metrics on time series data. We
then evaluate our system’s privacy-utility trade-off, as well
as its performance in real-time, low-latency use cases, such
as in embedded and home IoT devices. We show that our
system provides privacy gains without a significant utility
cost, and can run efficiently and scale well on cheap hard-
ware with high-frequency sensor data.
2. Background
2.1 Privacy Metrics
Privacy in the context of personal data is a well explored
topic. It is not the goal of this work to develop new metrics,
but rather to apply and evaluate existing metrics to the sys-
tems we develop.
Often privacy and anonymity are used interchangeably,
but there are some very distinct differences between the two.
The demand for privacy exists despite anonymity, and is in-
deed more pronounced when individuals are not anonymous.
Dalenius first coined the term quasi-identifier in 1986 [9]
and since then, a number of seminal publications have dealt
with the process of identifying individuals by making infer-
ences from data that may not contain any explicit identifiers
(such as a UID).
Famous examples include the ability to uniquely identify
87% of the population of the United States by combining
gender, birth date, and post code information [20], as well
as the deanonymization of the Netflix Prize Dataset by com-
bining it with public IMDB data [19].
While deanonymization relies on the linkage of data to
explicit identifiers, more privacy-centric methods focus on
making it more difficult to connect sensitive attributes to
individuals.
Recent, comprehensive survey papers describe an ex-
tensive range of metrics for a vast array of different pur-
poses [10] and organise these into taxonomies [22].
While many of these provide average risk measurements
over a given dataset, some have been repurposed to provide
“one-symbol information”, or the marginal mutual informa-
tion from the appending of an additional record [2, 3].
The following is a description of a number of metrics
suitable to our method. We divide these by output measure
into two categories based on Wagner and Eckhoff’s taxon-
omy [22].
2.1.1 Similarity/Diversity
K-anonymity [21] is an exceedingly prevalent privacy mea-
sure. To quote the original paper, “A release provides k-
anonymity protection if the information for each person con-
tained in the release cannot be distinguished from at least
k-1 individuals whose information also appears in the re-
lease”. Explicit identifiers are completely suppressed and
quasi-identifiers generalised. Similarly, rows in time series
data can form equivalence classes after microaggregation
based on a quasi-identifier column, where the smallest clus-
ter has k rows.
L-diversity [18] is an extension of k-anonymity that ad-
ditionally requires that sensitive attributes are well-represented
in each equivalence class (for various definitions of “well
represented”). It is therefore less susceptible to homogeneity
attacks and background knowledge attacks. L-diverse data is
by definition at least l-anonymous.
T-closeness [16] goes yet another step beyond and takes
account of the distance between the distribution of sensitive
attributes in any single equivalence class, to the distribution
of sensitive attributes across the whole dataset. The distance
measure is arbitrary, though the original paper uses Earth
Mover’s Distance. T-closeness for the whole dataset is the
maximum of t-closeness for each equivalence class. This
addresses potential attacks on l-diversity such as skewness
attacks.
2.1.2 Information Gain/Loss
While pure entropy is an average value over a distribu-
tion, we want a marginal measure for every symbol. This
is where information surprisal becomes useful. Surprisal
is also known as self-information, however as this term is
sometimes used interchangeably with entropy, we will re-
fer to it as surprisal throughout this paper. As a measure,
it has been used in the past to, for example, measure infor-
mation gain from the attributes of public social media pro-
files [8]. When sampling a variable, surprisal is a measure
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Figure 2. An overview of of our implementation
(in information-entropic bits) of uncertainty associated with
sampling this variable — the negative logarithm of the prob-
ability of a sample.
Finally, many inferences can be made just from identify-
ing patterns in time series data. A simple example is infer-
ring location from temperature data, while a more advanced
example is identifying what you watch on TV from smart
meter data [11]. The Pearson correlation coefficient has been
used in the past to compare smart meter data before and af-
ter anonymization [14] as opposed to other common distance
measures such as KL-divergence [13].
Similarly, we can can cross-correlate data with itself
shifted by varying time lags: autocorrelation. This allows
us to detect seasonality and patterns in time series data, and
on doing so, suppress, shift, or perturb the output.
2.2 Access Control
Our method can be adapted to any access control system
that has a notion of per-consumer permissions, and as such,
access control mechanisms are outside the scope of this
paper. For our purpose, we implement a macaroon-based [4]
bearer token system.
The arbiter in figure 1 mints tokens with embedded pri-
vacy thresholds (as macaroon caveats) that correspond to the
permissions a bearer has. It maintains a record of these per-
missions that a user can modify at any time and take effect
when an old token expires or is revoked.
The arbiter then cryptographically signs these tokens and
passes them to data consumers potentially controlled by
third parties (in this case drivers or apps). When a consumer
makes a request to a store, it attaches the relevant token to
the request. Permissions are embedded in these tokens, so
the store/producer is aware of the privacy context and per-
missions, and can verify these tokens through their signa-
tures using a secret key shared by the arbiter and the store
beforehand.
Thus, access control decisions based on privacy can be
made on a request to request basis.
3. Implementation
This section details our implementation and describes fig-
ure 2 which provides a visual overview of it.
We begin by transforming time series data d(t) continu-
ously to N different granularities. This can be for any defi-
nition of “granularity”, however in our implementation, we
calculate the mean of every 2n samples for n = 0, · · · , N
and interpolate by nearest neighbour. Alternatives include
plain downsampling, summing/aggregation, or other forms
of averaging. We calculate means as these have the greatest
utility to our evaluation use case.
We denote these granularity transformation functions as
gn(x), the outputs of which map to the original time series
in the following manner: dn(t) = gn(d(t)).
For every new sample in the transformed data, dn(t), we
update one or more corresponding privacy scores based on
the privacy metrics described earlier. For our evaluation, we
use surprisal so the unit of these scores is bits or shannons.
We describe how we implement this and other privacy met-
rics in more detail in the next sections. We denote this pri-
vacy measure as the function p(x).
The final component in this system is a multiplexer that
selects the transformed data stream with the highest granu-
larity but with a privacy score that is still below a threshold k.
The moment a data stream’s score exceeds k, the multiplexer
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Figure 3. Surprisal over active energy consumed each
minute with eight bins (gray) and an infinite window size
drops to a lower granularity, until it reaches the level of gran-
ularity that is the equivalent of a fixed grand mean across the
entire stream. This is the point at which n = N . With our
previously defined notation, our final output is o(t) = dm(t)
wherem = min{n | n ∈ Z∧n ∈ [0, N ]∧p(dn(t)) < k}. In
other words, the highest resolution transformed stream with
a privacy score below a given threshold.
dn(t) = gn(d(t)) (1)
s(t) = argmax
n∈Z
n∈[0,N ]
p(dn(t))<k
dn(t) (2)
In equation 2, s(t) is a shorthand to represent a function
that returns the index of the data stream selected at time t
used in figure 2. For a sample d(t) at time t, the overall out-
put can be formulated as a dynamic optimization problem.
Here, selected data stream index n is our decision variable.
min
n
dn(t)
s.t. n ∈ Z
n ∈ [0, N ]
p(dn(t)) < k
(3)
The threshold k is embedded in the tokens attached to
requests made by data consumers. By modifying k for a
consumer, we can modify the extent in permissions with
respect to the metric used, and thus achieve privacy-aware
access control.
It is important to note that dropping to a lower level
of granularity is done transparently without the consumer’s
Figure 4. Autocorrelation over power consumption for dif-
ferent fixed lags
knowledge. We also test a variant of this system where the
consumer directly requests a specific level of granularity, and
their request is rejected if it is above what they have permis-
sion to access. The consumer must then make a new request
to a lower granularity, which not only adds significant la-
tency, but the act of denying access itself reveals some infor-
mation on the nature of changes in the data, for instance if
a stream that a consumer originally had access to suddenly
became restricted.
As a proof of concept, we run the metrics described in the
previous section over UCI’s Individual Household Electric
Power Consumption Data Set [17]. We focus on just two
columns from this dataset: the timestamp column, and the
global (minute averaged) active power, which we convert
to watt hour. In order to more closely conform to realistic
scenarios, we treat the range of this data as an unknown that
is continuously updated as the maximum and minimum seen
values are exceeded.
As data processed is continuous, it must be quantized first
for certain metrics in order to become discrete. This is not
the case for input data that is for example a byte of sensor
data in the range [0, 255], or strings from a set of limited size
like country names. With continuous variables however, the
probability of any one sample is near-zero and so we must
divide the data into bins of a set interval in order for the
metrics to make sense.
Furthermore, as we perform these measurements online,
it is practically infeasible to repeat these for the entire dataset
on every new addition. In our final implementation, we
therefore only consider the data before a temporal cutoff
point using simple, fixed-length, rectangular windows. We
note however that windows with different configurations and
weightings may potentially yield cleaner results.
In figure 3, it is clear that as samples are added to empty
bins, surprisal spikes. As more are added to one bin (such as
around Wednesday at midnight), surprisal slowly decreases,
which makes sense intuitively. Suprisal is lowest for power
consumption values below 10 watt hour, as this is the most
replete bin.
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Figure 5. Stages of data transformation
To measure seasonality, we track autocorrelation across a
set of lags over time. This is different than simply building
a correlogram over a fixed length sequence, as we continu-
ously calculate cross-correlation in an online manner. Fig-
ure 4 visualises the most significant lags. For 12 hours, auto-
correlation is mostly higher than for 24 hours, which would
also hinted by maxima in a correlogram. This tells us that
patterns are most likely to arise at 12 hour periods, and we
can automatically take steps to suppress this by for instance
only emitting 12 hour averages. We can also normalise this
data and embed cross-lag, or per-lag autocorrelation thresh-
olds into our access control system. This could for example
block access to data with exceedingly high 12 hour autocor-
relation, but allow access to the same data only once it has
been downsampled to obfuscate this pattern. As such, this is
a simple, yet powerful metric to use in our system.
3.1 Databox Integration
Our system functions between data producers and con-
sumers. In Databox, this means between driver and app, be-
tween app and app, and between app and the outside world.
Every driver and app must output data via stores, therefore
the store is at first glance the most obvious place to imple-
ment our system.
There is however another alternative that is more versatile
from a development perspective, which is to implement our
system as a “privacy filter” app, that reads private data from
one store, and writes transformed data to a derived store.
This approach has the advantage of being modular as only
a single type of store is needed, while any number of type-
specific filtering apps can exist (e.g. an app that blurs faces in
images). The increase in network traffic and added overhead
would hurt latency however.
We therefore implement our solution as an app, but future
work may include hardcoding the most general types of
time series aggregation into stores, and the monitors for
the most common privacy metrics. Anything less common
can be delegated to an intermediate app. Figure 5 shows
this eventual pipeline — raw data enters at 1 , is written
into a store after being filtered/transformed at 2 , and a
second-order app 3 performs any additional more specific
transformations before the data 4 is output in its final form.
4. Evaluation
Our system evaluation is in two parts: first, we evaluate the
trade-off between privacy benefits and utility using our sys-
tem, then we measure the marginal latency and performance
when deploying this system in a realistic scenario on limited
hardware.
4.1 Privacy/Utility Evaluation
Our system provides privacy along the axis of the privacy
metric used based on the thresholds used. For example, to-
kens that only allow access to data with a surprisal value
of less than four bits will implicitly favour less granular
data. An emergent effect of this property is that higher
frequency inferences can be suppressed in aggregate time-
series datasets.
To test this, we take the same approach as previous work
in the same domain [15] and make use of the Reference En-
ergy Disaggregation Data Set (REDD). This dataset contains
detailed power usage data from a number of houses includ-
ing mains readings as well as on a per-device basis.
Our goal is to show that after subjecting aggregate mains
data to our privacy-aware access control system, we can
infer washer/dryer state while concealing microwave state.
A realistic use case may be a smart meter app that suggests
the best times to do your laundry based on your flatmates’
habits, but does not need to know anything about your eating
habits. Our system allows for this gain in privacy without
compromising utility.
We use the state (on or off) of the washer/dryers and
microwaves as ground truth and a Gaussian Naive Bayes
classifier to predict whether or not these devices are turned
on given mains data. The data has occurrences of both de-
vices being turned on both separately and together. For each
device, we plot Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves where we modify the privacy metric threshold, which
is in this case an upper bound on bits of entropy.
In reality, an app might not have access to household-
specific data to train such classifiers. We show however that
even in this case (figure 6) utility remains virtually the same
across thresholds while the undesired inference degrades.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
While the previous section showed that significant privacy
gains can be made without degrading utility, previous work
has achieved more impressive privacy/utility trade-offs [15].
Where our work differs is that it is also efficient enough to
run online for real-time streaming data on cheap hardware.
In this section we show this by implementing our sys-
tem over Databox, running it on typical hardware (an In-
tel NUC6i3SYH), and measuring the added latency in the
pipeline. We examine the difference in time to availability
(TTA) — the time between when a sensor emits a sample
and when it becomes available in its final form to an app at
the end of the pipeline. We can of course repeat the measure-
ments on all derived data ad infinitum, but this has limited
practical benefits.
We measure this latency for 20k samples under three
conditions:
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Figure 6. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for washer-dryer (utility; left) and microwave (attack; right)
Figure 7. Distributions of time to availability under differ-
ent conditions
• Datastream: Vanilla Databox times as a baseline. Access
control is binary and at the datastream level.
• Surprisal: Inclusion of our system in the pipeline using
surprisal as a privacy metric with a fixed threshold and
infinite window size.
• Windowed Surprisal: The same as the previous experi-
ment, but with a falloff of one minute.
Figure 7 shows the density of these latencies. The means,
with blue dotted lines drawn through, are at 535.1633 ms,
576.9499 ms, and 556.7980 ms respectively. The difference
between with and without surprisal calculation is negligible
and well within the tolerance for real-time applications. The
added latency is small enough that privacy filtering at this
fidelity is possible without impacting user experience.
The small difference of 41.7866 ms is only because the
calculation gradually gets slower as the number of sam-
ples increase. This can be mitigated by limiting the number
of past samples processed (in this case the window is one
minute or 6k samples long). As soon as the window is satu-
rated, the upwards trend in latency flattens and remains con-
stant. This way, the difference in latency was further reduced
by almost half to 21.6347 ms.
5. Conclusion
This paper presented a system for efficiently augmenting
token-based access control with privacy-awareness with-
out significantly impacting performance or utility. We de-
scribed our implementation and demonstrated its practicality
through experimental evaluations in terms or privacy gains
and performance on cheap hardware.
5.1 Future Work
In this work we focused on time series sensor data and evalu-
ated a single privacy metric. The clearest next step is expand-
ing this work to explore application on structured data as
well as other promising metrics such as similarity/diversity
measures and autocorrelation for measuring seasonality. The
latter can be compared with more nuanced methods such as
Kullback-Leibler divergence [12] (relative entropy), cluster
classification and regression analysis. Capacity [6] can sim-
ilarly be explored as a measure of loss of anonymity.
Independent of the privacy metrics adapted to our sys-
tem, our multiplexer component (figure 2) can be expanded
to smoothly interpolate between granularity streams by as-
signing weights to each stream that sum to one.
Similarly, different user-definable policies for how our
system reacts to passing thresholds can be explored. In-
stead of modifying granularity, possibilities include entirely
blocking access, repeating old samples, adding noise, or gen-
erating fake “safe” data through runtime supervised learning
(such as with an LSTM neural network). Each of these can
be evaluated against each other in terms of privacy gains and
performance.
Our work shows that there is a lot of potential in the
space of information-theoretic, context-independent, real-
time privacy awareness for access control on the edge.
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